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3Executive Summary
• The ongoing conflict in Syria has led to distortions in 
agriculture, food production and availability, distribution and 
consumption, with attendant effects on food insecurity and 
malnutrition. 
• Uncertainties about and/or absence of governance, 
weakened institutions, changing donor funding priorities/
involvement and diminished local research capacity 
constrain traditional opportunities for long-term 
contingency planning and access to and integration of 
local expertise that is essential for timely, evidence-based 
decision-making.
• The extensive loss of human and intellectual capital in 
Syria, as academics are displaced from high-risk areas, as 
a matter of safety and security, means that the pipeline of 
expertise necessary for future societal rebuilding efforts is 
narrow and fragile and requires attention. 
• A Round Table (RT) meeting was held in June 2019 to 
provide a platform for Syrian academics in exile in Turkey 
to share their expertise and to initiate a discussion about 
transition strategies away from short-term emergency 
aid to long-term food and health security with other 
researchers, relevant decision-makers, international and 
local (including Syrian) NGOs and responders to the crisis. 
This resulted in a number of outcomes:
– Creation of a nascent network of expertise exploring 
the question of transition and long-term contingency 
planning for food and health security in Syria. 
– Strengthened and extended partnerships between 
researchers, practitioners and decision-makers in the 
UK, Syria and countries in the region receiving Syrian 
academics in exile (primarily Turkey).
– A provisional framework for an expert information 
ecosystem to incorporate local cultural and technical 
expertise into future Syrian socio-economic development 
and reconstruction programmes. This includes the 
development of repositories to house and curate a 
catalogue of expertise, data and ongoing research 
outputs, and funding opportunities.
– Identification of an important role for knowledge broker 
organisations at the interface between researchers, 
decision-makers and practitioners to ensure knowledge 
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Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) attainment is severely 
compromised not only in fragile and conflict-affected 
countries (FCAS) like Syria but also in those countries that 
host their refugee populations. Protracted conflict involving 
forced internal and external displacement of people leads 
to severe poverty, destruction of health services and food 
insecurity due to pressure on land and water resources; 
fractured supply and value chains for essential crops and 
products; interrupted distribution routes; and volatile market 
prices; with the consequent effects of acute malnutrition, 
increased morbidity and mortality, poor mental health and 
impaired cognitive development, particularly in children.
Emergency interventions are focused on survival, short-
term needs and recovery efforts (e.g. food, medicines, 
seed multiplication, irrigation canal rehabilitation, bakeries) 
at the expense of longer-term strategic approaches which 
incorporate broader socio-economic or environmental 
considerations. This may result in unforeseen tensions 
between short- and long-term food security demands which 
could undermine resilience of different agricultural sectors.  
Syrian academics in exile offer a wealth of local knowledge, 
connection and expertise, a major part of Syria’s intellectual 
and cultural capital that has been largely neglected by 
the intelligence gathering and analysis activities informing 
humanitarian responses to the crisis. In June 2019, 
the University of Edinburgh (UoE) and the Cara Syria 
Programme (Cara Syria) held a Round Table (RT) meeting 
to provide a platform for academics,  decision-makers, 
practitioners and other responders to the crisis, to share their 
knowledge, culture and expertise in food security and discuss 
the development of strategies for a successful transition away 
from humanitarian provision of short-term food supplies and 
agriculture inputs towards long-term contingency planning 
and ultimately, reconstruction. 
In this report, we provide an overview of the history and 
current situation of agriculture and food security in Syria 
(Section 1); a description of existing knowledge, expertise 
and capacity in agriculture and food production and 
challenges for longer-term reconstruction (Section 2); drivers 
of change (Section 3) as prioritised by RT participants in 
order to consider longer-term trends (Section 4); outcomes in 
two different scenarios (ongoing war versus fragile peace) in 
order to prioritise interventions for long-term sustainable food 
production and consumption (Section 5); models of how best 
to incorporate local knowledge into decision-making (Section 
6); and, conclude with possible next steps as discussed at the 
RT (Section 7).
1. Introduction
62. Agriculture and Food Security in Syria:  
Situation Report
Historical Drivers of Change
A historical timeline was developed with Syrian academics 
to encourage RT participants to think about and discuss 
drivers that had influenced and shaped the evolution of 
agriculture and food production in Syria since the 1960s. This 
timeline (seen in Figures 1a and 1b) takes into consideration 
important factors that have had a direct impact on the 
evolution of agricultural production, as well as exogenous 
factors that may have had an indirect impact. 
Key Developments in the History of Agricultural 
Production in Syria
Agriculture has always been an important economic, social 
and cultural activity in Syria. 
“Syrians are producers. Syrians are consumers.  
They are cooks. (The) Syrian kitchen is very famous ....”
The country was once considered the breadbasket of the 
Middle East and one of the largest exporters of livestock, 
as well as crop, vegetable and horticultural products, such 
as pistachios, olives, figs, oranges and lemons. Syria is now 
in a state of acute food insecurity and reliant on imports 
of food and agricultural inputs for survival. Rebuilding this 
critical sector will be one of the most important elements of a 
transition strategy towards reconstruction and peace.
The ongoing conflict is undoubtedly the primary driver of the 
destruction of agriculture in Syria.  However, in the context 
of historical political, economic and environmental changes 
(including extreme weather events) in Syria over the last 
50 years, together with the significant shift of agricultural 
production from a public to a private good, it is also clear that 
the sector was poised to falter, even before the conflict began. 
The following figures (1a and 1b) are a simplified summary 
of the interplay between political, economic, societal, 
technological and environmental drivers over time that 
shaped the evolution of agriculture in Syria to the present day. 
It is not intended to be a comprehensive historical analysis 
of events but is included to enable reflection on the lessons 
learned from the complexity of a changing system over time.
Pre-Conflict 
In the 1970s, both the agricultural and water sectors were 
managed by central government.  Crops (such as wheat and 
barley) were at the centre of strategic agricultural planning, 
which followed a Soviet-style model of “buy-high, sell-low”.1 
Costs of agricultural inputs such as fuel, seeds and fertiliser 
were subsidised. Planners would calculate the total amount 
of crop required to meet the nation’s food security needs, 
and the necessary volume to export for cash.2 This was 
managed through centralised agricultural planning and policy 
development offices/centres. Farmers would be instructed 
on the quantity of specific crops to plant and the government 
would guarantee prices for strategic crops such as wheat, 
cotton, sugar-beet, tobacco and maize. A compulsory pricing 
scheme for consumers was also in place for certain basic 
foods, such as bread and milk. 
1 “Buy-high, sell low” refers to producing more. This helped the government 
to strategically store basic crops/seeds for at least for five years. Global 
Communities, Partners for Good (2018) Resilience through Humanitarian 
Assistance: Agriculture in the Syria Conflict.  Edited by David Humphries. 
Available at www.globalcommunities.org p9.
2. Agriculture and Food Security in Syria: Situation Report
2 FAO (2003) Fertiliser use by crop in the Syrian Arab Republic. Available at 
http://www.fao.org/3/Y4732E/y4732e06.htm.
71960s 1970s 1980s
Agrarian reform: creation of  
stage farms
Government management  
of ag resources
Land Reform in 1958 63, 66: peasants organised into  
service cooperatives
Redistribution of land to peasant 
farmers apart from Jazira – where 
live semi-nomadic tribes who 
support the Party
State marketing into new fields – 
fruit and vegetables
Ministries falling short of 
unrealistic targets
Fragmentation of implementation 
of plans
Legally binding state  
investment plans
Contracts between owners and 
tenants had to be in writing and 
automatically renewed (Law 134)
Key targets for crop, levels 
of inputs, credit
Syrian trade policy prior to 1990 characterised by government intervention
New forms of credit State investment in reclaimed and 
irrigated lands
State investment in hydraulic 
projects
State control over raw materials
State crop rotation plan
Increase in Arab oil-wealth 
opportunities for costly projects
Reduction of farmer debts
Production cooperatives on  
newly irrigated land
Inflation
Investments: state contributes 
capital 25% (cultivated land) 
against 75% private investment
Peasants who work the land 
(even if not providing inputs) get 
increased % of harvests results in 
significant increase in income
State farms losing money and 
decline in farmers employees go 
to building sector
More land given to farmers to 
stem exodus of farm workers
Peasants evade state crop-
rotation plan
Increase in industrial, agricultural 
and tourism products
15 pilot project farms created for displaced within irrigation framework  
to create agro industrial sector and abundant electrical supply
Dam building – creates capacity in engineering
State farms associated  
with low productivity and high 
production costs
Declining numbers of agricultural workforce
Creation of Lake Assad 1973 
submerged villages in fertile lands 
and resulted in relocation
Fields irrigated but not drained 
become salified and unsuitable for 









Figure 1a. Drivers of change: food and agricultural production in Syria since 1960 
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8Declining numbers of agricultural workforce
1990s 2000s 2010s
Planning for supply to meet local demand and 
surplus for exports to generate foreign income
Law 10 of 1991 – land ownership size 
dependent on project needs and tax exemption
Move from setting quantitative targets to 
indicative planning through pricing
Privatisation of state farms in 2000-2005 
Decision 83 – political decision not law
Compulsory pricing policy for certain crops  
when selling to state run establishments.  
Prices frozen since 1996
Liberalised trade in agricultural products;  
procurement of inputs not available locally
All retiring civil servants given land on 
retirement or resignation
Agricultural support services: for extension services, vet care,  
pesticides, animal improvements
Agreement on share of Euphrates and Tigris 
river for water supply
Bottom-up approach to ag strategy but based 
on national targets
Establishment and support of organic 
farming (IFOAM), Law /12/2012
Private sector allowed to market and process 
other crops (apart from state owned crops like 
cotton, sugar beet and tobacco)
Establishment of the general 
commission for scientific agricultural 
research (GCSAR)
Exports of agricultural products  
(apart from wheat and those owned by state) 
now permitted
Prices of barley, chickpeas, lentils 
and sugar beet raised in 2005
Proposal to fix prices of machine services 
and transport
Tax exemptions for some parts of ag sector all 
exported products exempted in 2001
Cereal prices increase across world – 
hunger riots in Egypt in 2008
State lands turned over to investors
Low salaries
Taxes applied to livestock and exported 
products (exempt: olives, olive oil, cotton)
Creation of Syrian Investment Agency  
to encourage investment in all sectors, 
including agriculture
EU targeted as most important trade 
partner for Syria
Economic liberalisation: distribution 
of land in state farms and renting 
out of undistributed land confiscated 
during land reforms
Liberals empowered
Insufficient housing and transport 
to accommodate workers
Decrease in available technical 
competency in agriculture
More flexibility given to farmers 
re crop choice
Free extension services and 
training/capacity building centres. 
Training programmes on  
priority areas
Directorate of rural women 
created
Increase in drinking water 
consumption
Confusion and petitions over land 
ownership rights due to Decision 
83: redistribution of land to 
former owners, farm workers and 
employees of General Admin of 
Euphrates Basin
International food aid due to 
drought: emergency cereal 
reserves exhausted
Mass migration to urban centres 
for work
Peasant revolt in Disbi Afnan  
in 2002
Increase in drinking water 
consumption
Lack of recognition of rights 
of heirs drives lobbying for 
inheritance law to take into 
account when ownership of state 
farms transferred
Beneficiaries of reform are not 
rural constituents but individual 
tied to traditional power structures
High unemployment rates  
and poverty
SHOCK: Arab spring in 2011 
leads to protests and arrests  
over Assad
Increase in irrigated areas due to land reclamation and well drilling
Data driven sowing calendar
Agriculture rotations and  
crop structures based on land and 
water availability
Network of veterinary clinics –  
private sector provides local  
and intl medicines
Increase in extension services 
and disease control programmes
Increase in dairy cattle numbers, 
necessitating fodder
Self-sufficiency in goats, sheep, 
poultry and eggs
Increase in land-holder numbers, 
decrease in holding size
increase in water poverty
High population growth, fixed land resources, reliance on rainfall SHOCK: Drought at the end  
of 2000s for three consecutive 
years 2006-2011
9Drivers of Change 2011
Political
Lack of governmental services for extension services, vet care, 
pesticides, training and knowledge transfer








Lack of governmental 




Lack of agricultural governance,  
lack of coordination between the donors 
and local NGOs
Lack of olive marketing policies Lack of national intervention 
policies
Lack of local biodiversity 
protection
Lack of credits, cash or inputs 
support for farmers
Absence of some strategic crops, 
cotton and maize
Farmer behavioural change in  
production practices, including fewer and  
lower quality inputs and techniques
Reduction of strategical crops − 
wheat, fodder crops
Low quality/non-controlled quality inputs, fertilisers, 
pesticides, medicines and vaccines
Low income –  
uneconomic farming
Migration, especially academics, 
agr. engineers and farmers
Internal displacement led to fields 
left uncultivated
Lack of cultivatable fields, especially for 
internally displaced families
Food production knowledge exchange 
displaced-host communities
Destroying of national agricultural 
research centers
Stop of national irrigation  
projects
Lack and old machinery and 
spare parts
Low quality in HE – Lack of highly 
skilled agriculture engineers
Lack of research
Environmental pollination, local 
fuel production, war activities
Loss of local varieties and imports 
of non-certified plant materials Drought/floods
Figure 1b. Drivers of change: food and agricultural production in Syria since 2011 
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Farmer behavioural change in  
production practices, including fewer and  
lower quality inputs and techniques
2019
Stop of international developing 
projects/agreements
Lack of agricultural planning on 
the whole land scale
 
Siege food as a weapon
Lack of national development 
policies
Lack of environmental  
protection policies, water 
resources management
Lack of food manufactures, value 
chain, and work opportunities
Farmers forced to sell their agriculture and livestock 
assets to survive
Low food availability,  
vulnerability
Self food production cultural 
knowledge in food production  
and consumption
The women’s participation in agriculture 
sector (-/+)
Lack of international  
engagement in research and 
development studies
Absence of Syrian  
academic engagement
Limited access to suitably 
qualified academic staff
Fire destroying crops  
and forests




Land reform policies in the 1970s facilitated the creation of 
state farms and redistribution of land to peasant farmers and 
rural people. This, in combination with policies to improve 
credit and reduce farmer debt, resulted in consolidation of 
a rural power base for the ruling Ba’ath party.  However, this 
ultimately had a detrimental impact for pasture land, due to 
overstocking, overgrazing in some areas, and soil depletion 
in others due to frequent ploughing for crop production. The 
planting of water-hungry crops, such as cotton, contributed 
to the depletion of already scarce water resources. State 
water-management control resulted in significant government 
investment in expensive hydraulic projects, engineering 
infrastructure and dam building in order to coordinate water 
management for irrigation; while private well-drilling was 
penalised. 
Although the industrial sector was thriving, the agricultural 
sector began to experience a decline in the 1980s. State 
farms were increasingly expensive to run, due to high 
production costs and low productivity. The numbers of 
farmers decreased as they moved into more profitable 
industrial and engineering sectors where employment 
opportunities were better. The agricultural sector opened up 
to private investors in the early 2000s, with an investment in 
agricultural support services for veterinary care, pesticide use 
and other extension services for specialised training in priority 
areas. The private sector was allowed to market, process and 
export crops, other than strategic state crops such as wheat, 
barley, cotton, sugar beet, tobacco, chickpeas and lentils.  
While there were some incentives to retain farming 
expertise, agricultural production continued to decline as the 
government began to prioritise high-tech and commercial 
enterprises, resulting in increasing migration of people 
from rural areas to cities. The introduction of Decision 833 
exacerbated this problem, as it resulted in confusion over 
land ownership and inheritance rights. The beneficiaries of 
this decision appear to be tied to the establishment, rather 
than rural constituents. Subsequent withdrawal of pro-farmer 
policies, such as subsidies for fuel to enable irrigation (2008) 
and subsidies for fertiliser (2009) by the government also 
coincided with a four-year drought.4 As a result, crop yields 
fell dramatically and farmers were forced to sell crops and 
livestock to survive.
Years of Protracted Conflict
In 2011, more than a million people were living in Syria’s 
cities in conditions of poverty and unrest, a situation made 
worse by the long-lasting drought and its detrimental impact 
on water supplies and agricultural production. Meanwhile 
the Arab Spring galvanised protests in Tunisia, Egypt and 
elsewhere.  When the protests spread to Syria, this catalysed 
the outbreak of the ongoing conflict. The conflict in Syria has 
had a devastating impact on Syria’s agricultural capacity, 
resulting in $16 billion in total losses between 2011 and 2106, 
including more than $3 billion losses in infrastructure, such as 
irrigation canals, wells and veterinary support.5 Food prices 
are estimated to have increased by 800% since 2010. As a 
result, in Syria today, it is estimated that 6.5 million people 
are currently food insecure and a further 4 million are at risk 
of becoming acutely food insecure.6 Despite the sustained 
conflict, agriculture is still considered an important part of 
Syria’s economy (26% GDP)7 and critical for self-sufficiency 
for more than 75% of households who grow their own food for 
consumption.  
In rural areas, farming is continuing and markets are 
still functioning in part, although access to road and 
transportation routes is not always secure. Public assets 
for manufacturing no longer have government oversight 
and there has been a significant breakdown in water 
infrastructure. Lack of fuel and electricity means that it is 
not possible to use existing irrigation canals and, in the 
absence of government controls, farmers routinely drill 
underground wells, causing further damage to aquifers and 
depleting already scarce water resources.  The de-regulation 
of the sector has enabled the private sector to invest in 
agro-pharmacies, but there are still challenges with respect 
to maintaining quality assurance of agricultural inputs. 
For example, shortages of pesticides and fertilisers have 
incentivised imports of higher priced, but lower quality and 
lower safety alternatives. The livestock sector has ostensibly 
suffered less than the crop sector, due to the presence of 
veterinary services that are still in place in government-
controlled regions to keep livestock assets resilient. 
3 Under Decision 83: “Land was parcelled out in shares of 3 ha. for irrigated 
land and 8 ha. for non-irrigated land. It formally allocated ‘right of use’, 
and not property. It called for land to be distributed to, in order of priority, 
the former owners, the farm workers, and employees of the General 
Administration of the Euphrates Basin (GADEB).It triggered tension and 
competition between these three categories.” Hinnebusch R, El Hindi A, 
Khaddam M, Ababsa M (2011) Agriculture and Reform in Syria. University 
of St Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies. Published by the University of St 
Andrews Centre for Syrian Studies School of International Relations. Fife, 
Scotland, UK p94.
4 Global Communities, Partners for Good (2018) Resilience through 
Humanitarian Assistance: Agriculture in the Syria Conflict.  Edited by David 
Humphries. Available at www.globalcommunities.org p9.
5 Ibid.
6 Food Security Cluster (2017) Food security situation in Syria: Expanded 
version of the Food Security Sector Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018. 
Whole of Syria Food Security Sector.
7 FAO (2017) Counting the cost: Agriculture in Syria after 6 years of crisis. 
Available at: http://www.fao.org/3/b-i7081e.pdf.
2. Agriculture and Food Security in Syria: Situation Report
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8 Longley, C, Christoplos, I and Slaymaker, T, (2006) Agricultural 
rehabilitation: Mapping the linkages between humanitarian relief, social 
protection and development. Humanitarian Policy Group Research Report 
22, Overseas Development Institute, London, cited by Giordano, T (2011) 
Agriculture and economic recovery in post-conflict countries: Lessons we 
never learnt. Development Bank of South Africa. Development Planning 
Division Working Paper Series No. 22.
9 Giordano, T (2011) Agriculture and economic recovery in post-conflict 
countries: Lessons we never learnt. Development Bank of South Africa. 
Development Planning Division Working Paper Series No. 22.
10 It is worth noting that in the Turkey hub, most NGOs have at least two to 
three agronomists and veterinarians who are involved in planning and 
implementation of humanitarian programmes. These are coordinated 
through the clusters and sub-cluster working groups to avoid duplication of 
efforts. These experts have started to support the ministry of agriculture/SIG 
in developing studies and projects.
However, in opposition areas, there is still a significant 
decline in poultry numbers and grazing areas; there are 
restricted movements of livestock breeders, and no subsidies 
for fodder, or vaccines, which are also of low quality. Syria 
is reliant on imports of food and agricultural inputs (e.g. 
fertilisers, seeds, medicines) for the survival of its people. 
“We as humanitarian actors … have limitations due 
to several factors. First the donors’ preferences, and 
second, the situation on the ground…. We don’t speak to 
the donors without having an assessment of the situation 
on the ground and without contacting the beneficiaries 
directly (to) get (understand) their priorities.”
In the future, rebuilding this critical sector will be one of the 
most important elements of a transition strategy towards 
reconstruction and peace. Current interventions occur at the 
expense of longer-term strategic approaches that incorporate 
broader socio-economic or environmental considerations.8 
This may result in unforeseen tensions between 
short- and long-term food security demands that could 
undermine longer-term resilience and generate unintended 
consequences.  These tensions are likely exacerbated by 
difficulties in on-the-ground coordination and diminished 
regional and international collaborative research ties between 
funder, researchers, universities, producer organisations, 
local and international NGOs and the private sector.9 
Migration, resulting in the internal and external displacement 
of people, means that much of the country’s practitioner, 
scientific and technological expertise may reside outside 
Syria and remain inaccessible to decision-makers. 
As a result, relevant context-specific intelligence and 
expertise may be neglected from social and development 
programmes.10  For example, interventions may not be 
compatible with local practices or growing conditions; 
agricultural inputs (such as new cultivars) may be supplied in 
advance of suitability testing and without knowledge of any 
long-term unintended consequences on local species.  
2. Agriculture and Food Security in Syria: Situation Report
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3. Local Knowledge and Resources
“Agriculture is culture” but all cultures have boundaries
Syria is notable for its different types of boundary, which 
drives significant heterogeneity within the country. These 
include: agro-ecological boundaries; geopolitical boundaries; 
and pre-existing and emerging knowledge boundaries. 
Figure 2. Schematic map of Syria illustrating its agro-
ecological boundaries. Syria is called the “hand with five 
fingers” for the different growing regions, which are related  
to rainfall. 
Zone 1: Rainfall exceeds an average of 350mm annually. 
Rain-fed crops (e.g. wheat, legumes) and summer crops (e.g. 
melon and watermelon) predominate. 
Zone 2:  Rainfall between 250 and 350mm during at least 
two-thirds of the monitored year. Barley, wheat, legumes and 
summer crops
Zone 3: Rainfall between 250 and 350mm with not less than 
250 mm during half of the monitored year. Crops are grown 
every one to three years, mostly barley but also legumes.
Zone 4: 200−250 mm and not less than 200 mm during half 
the monitored year. A marginal zone between arable and 
desert, primarily used for grazing and/or barley.
Zone 5: Desert and steppe zone (~55% of national area) 
primarily used for nomadic livestock grazing and irrigated 
agriculture.
 
11 FAO (2003) Fertilizer use by crop in the Syrian Arab Republic. Available at 
http://www.fao.org/3/Y4732E/y4732e06.htm.
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Syria is recognised as “a hand with five fingers” – that is, 
five distinct but overlapping agro-ecological areas that 
circumscribe and define what is grown where and by whom 
(Figure 2). The presence of all five areas is necessary for a 
successful Syrian future.  The following zones are adapted 
from FAO and ICARDA classifications.11
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Agro-ecological boundaries exhibit relative stability over 
time, although the speed of change may be influenced by 
climate change. These boundaries delineate heterogeneous 
farming cultures and environments that result in different 
producer and consumer activities and different needs and 
measures of success on the ground. There remain gaps in 
expertise and knowledge that need to be closely mapped to 
these boundaries. Syria’s agro-ecological zones do not neatly 
coincide with current political borders. Addressing natural 
resource demands and constraints will require cooperation 
across geopolitical boundaries. The transition between 
short-term emergency responses and longer-term recovery 
and reconstruction efforts is likely to be felt acutely in the 
overlapping political and agro-ecological zones. 
Geopolitical Boundaries 
Unlike agro-ecological zones, geopolitical boundaries are 
more permeable and dynamic – and this affects the actors, 
institutions and types of donor-funded activities, in different 
regions. These activities include, but are not limited to:
– emergency food baskets;
– early recovery programmes and resilience-building 
(northwest) including wheat value-chain projects and 
indirect seeds multiplication efforts.
Traditional governance structures and institutions have been 
weakened since the beginning of the conflict. There are 
NGOs and agencies currently implementing programmes that 
are well coordinated in some areas and fragmented in others. 
Associations12 and working groups emerge, disappear and 
re-emerge in different locations, as people’s circumstances 
for and their needs change. Membership of many of these 
associations is fluid, their existence is time-limited and 
contingent on donors’ funding priorities, which respond to the 
lifecycle of the conflict.  This makes it challenging to forge 
traditional working partnerships and avoid duplication of effort 
at strategic, tactical and operational levels.
Due to the conflict, the country is fragmented into either 
regime- or non-regime-controlled areas. This has resulted 
also in the fragmentation of agriculture-related associations. 
For example, the General Union of Syrian Farmers, which is 
an association allied to the regime, is fragmented into several 
farmer groups, especially in the non-regime-controlled area. 
These groups depend on regional projects such as wheat 
and olive production, livestock husbandry, beekeeping and 
water use. In addition, there are several new technical and 
consultancy groups which consider irrigation, CBR, SRP and 
vocational training working groups.
Human capital is in high demand in different regions in Syria, 
particularly for organisations that are starting to return staff to 
regime-controlled areas. However, the existence of geopolitical 
boundaries may erode trust and make it challenging to attract 
and retain human capital in a secure and safe way. Syrian 
research efforts, and therefore efforts to move towards longer-
term capacity- building, are limited by security.
“… if we (Syrians) are to refunction and to play a positive 
role in food security … we need equipment, laboratories, 
access to the land, safe(ty) from airstrikes and shelling 
and … scientists”.13
Researchers remain at risk and cannot wait for peace to 
begin so they can start implementing research programmes, 
but research capacity is depleted in regime-controlled 
geographical regions. There are challenges with scaling up 
activities until such time as Syrian academics/researchers14 
want to return and feel confident that they can do so safely. 
“The question is in which atmosphere we (‘neutral 
scientists’) can come back, yes? This is the question. 
Just I heard from you, (the term) ‘neutral scientists’. 
There is no neutral in Syria now, to be realistic ….  
Even the regime will not accept this concept … that you 
are neutral. I believe even that the regime hasn’t the real 
control … because we know also that there are other 
(dangerous) groups … in regime-controlled areas ….  
So the security situation is not… feasible now to come 
back.”15
13 A general view expressed at the Round Table was the need for active 
research centres, recognition of the local and active universities, 
collaboration with the regional and the international research centres.
3. Local Knowledge and Resources
14 For the purpose of this meeting and report, academics are researchers 
who are or were engaged in the academic/higher education community.  
Researchers is an all-encompassing term which includes academics, but 
also anyone educated to a certain level (Masters’ or PhD qualifications) who 
conducts research for industry, government or non-governmental agencies 
in a specific discipline (arts, humanities, social sciences or STEM subjects). 
Scientists are researchers who focus one or more of the STEM subjects.
15 Round Table Participant.
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16 ibid
17 For the purpose of this meeting and report, academics are researchers 
who are or were engaged in the academic/higher education community.  
Researchers is an all-encompassing term which includes academics, but 
also anyone educated to a certain level (Masters’ or PhD qualifications) who 
conducts research for industry, government or non-governmental agencies 
in a specific discipline (arts, humanities, social sciences or STEM subjects). 
Scientists are researchers who focus one or more of the STEM subjects.
18 Round Table Participant.
Knowledge Boundaries 
Knowledge boundaries also exist between Syrian academics 
(i.e. a researcher who is or was engaged in the higher 
education community) in different disciplines, and between 
Syrian researchers employed by industry, INGOs/NGOs and 
other agencies working in emergency relief areas. These 
constrain information-sharing and collaboration opportunities. 
Understanding how to mobilise knowledge across these 
boundaries is important in ensuring that decisions about food 
security are culturally appropriate, fit-for-purpose and tailored 
to the lived experience in Syria.  Historical boundaries or 
‘silos’ between research disciplines and cultures of expertise, 
which may have existed in Syria prior to the conflict, must 
be acknowledged and addressed, in order to enable 
interdisciplinary working.  
As Syrian expertise is exported, through migration of 
academics and practitioners, solutions are required that 
improve connectivity to colleagues in Syria and academic 
colleagues in the wider global community. 
“It seems to me that if you are doing research on Syrian 
communities both inside Syria and in exile that the key 
individuals who should be involved are the Syrians 
themselves...”16
Reconstruction efforts in agriculture require long lead-in 
times for preparation (e.g. breeding for disease resistance, 
new and improved seed varieties adapted to climate). Ethical, 
innovative approaches for independently brokering research 
between academics/researchers,17 practitioners, decision-
makers and funders are needed to continue effective work in 
conflict to improve preparedness for peace.
“I think it’s understandable. We all find ourselves at these 
moments of crisis focussing on the now, and sometimes, 
as many people have pointed out, the crisis that was 
meant to be short-lived has turned into nine years …. 
Well, maybe it’s going to be another little while yet, and 
so the people that will be at the forefront of solutions may 
not be the people who are the scientists now but maybe 
will be the scientists of tomorrow.”18
16
4. Prioritising Drivers of Change
4. Prioritising drivers of change
Conflict has been the most significant shock to the Syrian 
agricultural system in the last 50 years. However, there 
are also underlying drivers of change that are important 
to consider. These critical uncertainties, identified from 
the historical timeline, were prioritised by RT participants 
and clustered thematically (Table 1). These outputs were 
subsequently used to inform a discussion about future 
scenarios, and to construct a problem tree and results map 
(Figure 4).
Table 1. Critical uncertainties that influence transition strategies away from emergency aid to long-term reconstruction
• Lack of access to academic/
researcher expertise that is no 
longer in country and cannot return
• Lack of access to extension services 
and quality education
• Increased role of women in the 
workforce
• Increasing water poverty − reduction 
in groundwater levels and sources 
of replenishment for safe drinking, 
sanitation and irrigation  
• Dependency on water sources 
outside Syria (in Turkey) and 
elsewhere for replenishable water 
supply
• Preservation of natural resource 
heritage (e.g. genetic resources and 
seeds from lost Syrian forests) 
• Market forces (prices, value chains 
and agriculture as private rather than 
public goods)
• De-regulation and absence of strong 
institutions that are responsible 
for standards and certification of 
agricultural products (inputs such as 
pesticides, fertilisers etc.)
• Emergence of privately run and 
owned businesses 
• Increase in black markets, 
counterfeit drugs and agricultural 
inputs  
• Changing funder priorities
High impact  
and 
uncertainty 
Human Capital Natural Resources Agricultural Policy
• Competition from expatriate 
expertise from, and diversion of, 
Syrian expertise to support China, 
Russia, Iran (sent in to develop 
markets to feed their populations) − 
exacerbation of “brain drain”
• Kinship networks: sources of income, 
communication and expertise
• Availability of fuel and machinery
• Transport: availability, accessibility 
of road network (mines, damage to 
infrastructure, security)
• Fire hazards (resulting from conflict 
activities)
• Climate change: increase in 
greenhouse gas emissions; extreme 
weather events such as drought, 
flooding; changes in distribution of 
pathogens, pests, vectors and hosts/
reservoirs of infectious disease 
• Land ownership and tenure 
(Decision 83 (2000))availability, 
access, use for agriculture, 
ownership − by state or private








• Improved information sharing 
networks
• Incentives to return
• Trust in security
• Education and training initiatives for 
agriculture
• Business models for farming and 
innovation
• Gender balance and women-
empowering initiatives
• Innovation to enable self-sufficiency 
– “circular economy”
• Climate-smart agriculture
• Private sector investment
• Inclusion of multi-disciplinary 
expertise (other than agriculture) to 
address cross-cutting unintended 
consequences)
• Holistic agricultural policy reform. 




174. Prioritising drivers of change
Food and Agriculture as an Engine for Peace
Two short-term future scenarios (two-year time horizon) 
and the opportunities and challenges within each, were 
Figure 3. Future scenarios for Syria: ongoing conflict or fragile peace
Increasing frequency of security risks:  
constant violent clashes and new radical groups 
emerging
• “Brain drain”: continued internal and external 
displacement of people
• Increased pressures on natural resources water for 
sanitation and drinking
• Land reclaimed but unused and uncultivated due to 
risks from mines, fire
• Low market connectivity: markets functioning but 
restricted
• Increasing costs for food, agricultural inputs continued 
limited production; competition from lower quality, 
higher priced imports
• Limited engagement from some international donors 
(e.g. World Bank)
• Fragmented data collection and risks to researchers
• Stagnation of innovation due to limited private sector 
investment
Ongoing Conflict
Increasing stability and security in majority  
of regions within Syria; reduced frequency of 
security risks
• Return of Syrians from host countries (Turkey, Jordan, 
Lebanon and
• Existing pipelines of expertise and data driven 
approaches to decision making
• Return of donors, such as World Bank, which 
facilitates mobilisation of people and products
• Significant progress in de mining efforts secure roads 
and transport
• Infrastructure in place for effective decision making 
and support for animal, plant and environmental 
health and security
• Access to international markets
• Affordable, accessible food for all
• Climate smart farming practices
• Practitioner and producer driven local policy 
change and best practice guidelines
Fragile Peace
considered by participants: Ongoing conflict versus fragile 
peace (Figure 3). Characteristics of each scenario were 
based on plausibility, not probability of occurrence.
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Challenges and Opportunities
Figure 3. Future scenarios for Syria: ongoing conflict or fragile peace
Immediate
• Actors/organisations working in food assistance and 
emergency/medium-term intervention outnumber 
those working towards longer-term livelihoods and 
agriculture 
• The different stages within the lifecycle of the crisis 
experienced in different regions − resulting in different 
funder priorities, NGO and IGO engagement and 
security issues
• Saving and storage of food: Cold-chain infrastructure 
Challenges
Immediate
• Improved information and data-sharing to add value 
to existing evidence-basis for decision-making
• Operationalising different expertise in multi-partner 
multi-actor organisations through identification of key 
knowledge brokering organisations
• Creating a pipeline of expertise in other countries 




• Relationship of food security to other outcomes 
– such as diminished educational opportunities, 
increasing poverty, decreasing nutrition and different 
forms of malnutrition
• Protection of workers, particularly women and 
children working in the agriculture sector, while 
ensuring equitable and inclusive opportunities to 
improve livelihoods
• Ensuring lessons learned from the conflict and from 
pre-conflict history are translated into sustainable 
solutions 
Longer term
• Development of staged programmes of work and 
research that flexibly address both urgent and 
emergent issues, as well as longer-term strategic 
research priorities and programmes
• Anchoring solutions to the history and culture of 
agriculture in Syria through integration of multi-
disciplinary expertise
• Repairing communities through recognition of, and 
adaptation to, trauma. This includes trust- and peace- 
building initiatives, translating intergenerational food 
security programming into peace-building activities 
4. Prioritising drivers of change
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5. Trend Analysis 
5. Trend Analysis 
The food system in Syria is fundamental to the health and 
well-being of Syria’s people and central to achieving the 
2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  Future trends 
for Syria’s agriculture and food systems were inferred from 
the plenary discussions on the current situation in Syria, 
drivers of change and small group discussions around future 
scenarios.  Table 3 below compares the trends for Syria’s 
food system in contrast to global trends described by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF) Report 2017 - p6. Global 
aspirations articulated by WEF map neatly onto Syrian 
priorities for food systems − namely that future food systems 
need to be:
• economically and socially inclusive (central to which 
is prioritising equitable contributions from women, 
smallholders etc.);
• sustainable (i.e. conserving scarce resources, 
strengthening resiliency against future shocks)
• efficient (i.e. sufficient food, with minimal waste); and
• healthy (i.e. safe and nutritious diet).
Understanding long-term trends is important for subsequent 
identification of critical control points, i.e. a step in the system 
in which a control or intervention can be applied to reduce 
risk of a direct or indirect negative effect (Figure 4). These 
interventions need to be SMART (specific, measurable, 
attainable, realistic and relevant, and timely) so that 
appropriate monitoring and evaluation frameworks can be 
developed around them.
205. Trend Analysis 
Table 3. Cross-comparison of trends in Syrian agriculture compared to global trends in food systems (Adapted from the WEF 
Report:  Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems: A Scenarios Analysis)19
Syria (on current trajectory)
Assumptions to be confirmed through 
desktop review or empirical data collection
GlobalFood system 
trends
Increased urbanisation and changing farmer 
demographic that reflect greater numbers of 





Increasing inequality of wealth and extreme 
poverty
Reliance on small producers growing 
strategic crops and livestock/small ruminants
Increasing inequalities of wealth
Sluggish economic growth
Reliance on small producers
Macroeconomic 
trends
Undernourishment and micro-nutrient 
deficiencies in Syria. 
Possibility of over-nourishment for Syrians 
in some host country situations due to 
diet change resulting from accessibility/
affordability of food
Undernourishment, micro-nutrient 
deficiencies, over-nourishment – leading to 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs)
Triple burden of 
malnutrition
Extreme water poverty
Increased greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
due to land conversion and forestry 
degradation
Decreased energy and fuel availability
Decreased biodiversity
Agriculture results in water withdrawal 
(expected rise by 30%). Increase in GHG 




Political instability and conflict 
Trade sanctions
Forced migration
Nationalist and isolationist tendencies, 
changes in trade, increase in forced migration
Geopolitical 
dynamics
Technological stagnation and regression
No capacity to capitalise on emerging 
technologies due to lack of private 
investment, absence of intergenerational 
technical and scientific expertise in-country
Bio-innovation, gene editing, roboticsEmerging 
technologies
19 World Economic Forum Report: Shaping the Future of Global Food Systems: A Scenarios Analysis. Report by the WEF’s System Initiative on Shaping the Future 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Priority-setting: Strategy to Address Skills 
and Knowledge Gaps
6. Priority-setting: Strategy to address skills and knowledge gaps
Preparing for the Possibilities
Based on RT discussions, there are three critical priorities, 
which may need to be addressed for any transition strategy to 
be successful in the context of post-trauma/conflict recovery 
(Figure 4. Problem Tree and Results Map). 
I. Cultivating Human Capital: This requires a future-
oriented, inter-generational vision to sustain the long agri-
recovery process. An important element of this process is 
the strengthening the health, mental health and wellbeing 
of community members so that there is resilience and 
responsiveness to the demands of this new environment. 
Cultivating human capital also requires rebuilding trust 
and expertise in Syrian agriculture and food sectors, and 
identifying opportunities for existing or emerging “expert 
information ecosystems”. The latter is important for 
improvement of effective knowledge mobilisation between 
researchers, practitioners and decision-makers.
 Next steps: Developing trained and highly skilled 
individuals in a world where there are now fewer men than 
women in farming through:
i. CCP 1: Identifying, locating and mapping knowledge 
gaps, existing expertise, and academics/researchers21 
and practitioner skills. This includes local and foreign 
sources of expertise and links to global academic 
community without risk to people involved.
ii. CCP 2: Creation of cross-boundary information-sharing 
networks with decision-makers.
iii. CCP 3(i): Research and development in agricultural 
engineering, sustainable natural resources and 
biodiversity, emerging and new technologies (such as 
hydroponics).
 CCP3 (ii): Vocational training of women and young 
people in exile to address intergenerational gaps in 
education and expertise. This will require refinement of 
learner profiles and a focus on equity, equality and trust. 
Cultivating the human capital of young people post-
conflict is likely to demand new approaches to training 
and engagement. Connecting young people with “expert 
elders” may be an important aspect of this.
 CC3 (iii): Empowering and promoting Syrian women’s 
voices in decision-making processes and response 
efforts to improve food and health security in Syria 
to improve gendered relations within Syrian higher 
education, households and communities. 
II. Sustainable Resource Management: This requires 
investments in research and development (R&D) to avoid 
natural resource losses, conserve existing assets and 
mitigate long-term unintended consequences and trade-
offs, which result not only from the conflict, but also stem 
from emergency humanitarian interventions. It will also 
require careful cultivation of teams of interdisciplinary 
expertise to address cross-cutting challenges to ensure 
that Syria’s culture and heritage is conserved for future 
generations.
 Next steps:  Recognising that equitable, sustainable 
distribution and use of natural resources is at the heart 
of peace and stability in Syria and needs to be at the 
centre of future, long-term research priorities and recovery 
programmes.
i. CCP 4: Training in natural resource management: 
sustainable, climate-smart and precision-farming 
approaches. Developing cross-sectoral initiatives 
and outreach programmes that address sustainable 
management of water for irrigation, forests, land use and 
agriculture.
ii. CCP 5: Incentives to attract increased investment from 
private sector.
III. Grass-Roots Agricultural Policy Reform: Promoting 
data-driven decision-making and practitioner-led social and 
technological interventions to add value, reduce duplication 
and improve coherence of existing data collections. RT 
participants recognised serious agricultural policy reform 
(and with it, water policy reform) will be essential, but 
not possible without top-down support. Discussion was 
therefore focused on grass-roots activities to manage 
return of displaced farmers and encourage knowledge-
sharing from the current generation of farmers to the next. 
21 Supra note 12.
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 Next steps: Creating effective teams and effective 
communities in a post-conflict context. This will require 
specialist planning, intervention and trust. Local co-design 
and co-construction of psychological intervention will be 
key.
I. CCP 6: Community engagement and support, e.g. 
improving support and social cohesion for next-
generation of small-holder farmers; ensuring internally 
and externally displaced persons (IDPs and EDPs) have 
access to appropriate resources (including psychological 
rehabilitation and support provision to those who need it 
most).
II. CCP 7: Culture, history and behavioural research 
looking at cross-sectoral issues specific to post-
conflict contexts, that drive changes in agriculture, food 
production land and water use.
III. CCP 8: Training in standard setting and certification of 
agricultural inputs.
6. Priority-setting: Strategy to address skills and knowledge gaps
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7. Incorporating Local Knowledge 
into Decision-Making
7. Incorporating Local Knowledge into Decision-Making
Science Diplomacy Organisations
The successful achievement of priority I (Valuing human 
capital) is fundamental to the co-construction and 
implementation of locally-led effective, interdisciplinary 
approaches to address priorities II (Sustainable resource 
management) and III (Grass-roots agricultural policy reform), 
and therefore the primary focus of activities subsequently 
considered by RT participants. Creating and sustaining food 
and health security in fragile and conflict-affected states 
such as Syria, creates complex multi-faceted problems 
that demand cross-cutting interdisciplinary collaboration to 
find culturally appropriate scientific and technical solutions 
that also take into consideration the political and societal 
dimensions.  We propose to create a multi-partner, multi-
disciplinary cross-boundary team comprising academics 
and researchers (in Syria, in host countries and in the 
wider academic community), practitioners (new entrants, 
experienced farmers and technicians) and decision-
makers (actors and funders involved in humanitarian and 
reconstruction efforts) to improve knowledge mobilisation and 
integration (see Figures 5a and 5b). 
The aim is to create a nascent network of expertise to 
respond to both urgent and longer term policy, industry 
and research priorities through a focus on three strategic 
objectives: 
1. Combining expertise to answer the right question at the 
right time to inform evidence-based policy and planning.
2. Incorporating local knowledge and resources to promote 
positive behavioural change.
3. Building and coordinating activities to ensure effective 
emergency and transition responses and delivery of life-
saving and sustaining activities.
22 Supra note 12.
An important and unique feature of this network is the 
coordinated relationship between multi-disciplinary networks 
of expertise – bringing together STEM subject experts (e.g. 
agriculture, soil, engineering, natural resources, veterinary 
medicine, psychology, medicine) with experts from the arts, 
humanities and social sciences (e.g. anthropology, Islamic 
history and culture, literature). The nascent network also 
proposes to cross geographical, as well as disciplinary 
boundaries, linking together academics who remain in Syria 
with those living in exile in neighbouring host countries 
(Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon) and the wider, global 
academic community (Figure 5b). This will be coordinated by 
knowledge-brokering organisations, such as the Cara Syria 
Programme, that have specialised knowledge and experience 
in this area. Partnerships between academics/researchers22 
and practitioners living in exile or remaining in Syria and 
those within the wider global community, are necessary 
to access and sustain local knowledge and expertise and 
transfer new technologies and techniques, in order to create 
a pipeline of relevant expertise that can identify windows of 
opportunity to transition from humanitarian aid to recovery 
and reconstruction efforts (Figure 5b).
257. Incorporating Local Knowledge into Decision-Making
COLLECTIVE STATE
Seeking, creating 
& mobilising new knowledge
Linking activites & 
recombining expertise 
to answer right question 
at right time to inform 
evidence-based policy  
& funding agendas
Bridging & learning activites 
through incorporation of 
local knowledge & resources 
to promote positive 
behavioral change
ACADEMICS & RESEARCHERS
Knowledge economy leads to: 
Creative and innovative problem-solving- combining 
curiosity-driven and applied research
Building and coordinating 
activities to ensure effective 





Knowledge economy leads to: 
High quality decision-making
Knowledge economy leads to: 
Best practice & positive behavior change  
as a result of learning





Linking activites & 
recombining expertise to 
appropriately prioritise 
solutions
Pipeline of relevant 
expertise in anticipation 
of recovery and 
reconstruction efforts
RESEARCH PARTNERS IN SYRIA AND 
HOST COUNTRIES FOR SYRIAN ACADEMICS
Ground-truthing data to inform 
culturally-appropriate interventions
Building networks of 




COMMUNITY ACADEMICS IN EXILE
Leveraging partnerships 
and access to new technologies,  
expertise and institutions
Leveraging partnerships 
to sustain institutional memory 
and expertise, and encourage 
new entrants
Figure 5b.  Network of academic expertise 
and the importance of neutral knowledge 
brokering organisations to facilitate timely 
information sharing. Knowledge  
brokers need to be transparent  
and independent/neutral,  
as well as fluent in multi- 
disciplinary languages in  
order to ensure  
mobilisation of knowledge  
across disciplinary  






SHORT-TERM RESPONSES LONG-TERM STRATEGIC PLANNING
Low- and high-tech solutions
Life-sustaining Self-sufficiency Food and Global Health Strategy
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8. Discussion and Next Steps
8. Discussion and Next Steps
Seeds of Peace
• This round table was a necessary and unique opportunity 
to facilitate dialogue between academics/researchers,23 
practitioners and decision-makers working towards food 
and health security in Syria. 
• Emergency interventions are focused on life-saving, 
short-term needs (i.e. food, fertilisers, seeds, medicines at 
the expense of longer-term strategic approaches, which 
incorporate broader socio-economic or environmental 
considerations. 
• Uncertainties about and/or absence of governance, 
weakened institutions and changing funder priorities 
and involvement, place constraints on evidence-based 
decision-making and exacerbate tensions between 
short- and long-term food security demands, undermining 
resilience of different agricultural sectors in the long-term. 
• Migration resulting in the internal and external 
displacement of people, means that much of the country’s 
scientific and technological expertise resides outside Syria. 
The extensive loss of in-country human and intellectual 
capital in Syria, as academics are displaced from high-
risk areas as a matter of safety and security, means that 
the pipeline of expertise necessary for future societal 
rebuilding efforts is narrow, fragile and requiring attention.
• Improving local knowledge-sharing about the culture and 
history of agriculture, food access, production, preparation 
and food behaviours, will improve the effectiveness of 
strategic development for future reconstruction of the 
agricultural sector and Syrian food systems particularly if 
there are lessons to be learned from responses to previous 
food-system shocks (such as conflict and drought). 
24 Ibid.
• A multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary approach is needed to 
address different gaps in expertise and training, whether 
they are technical training expertise and/or psychological 
needs and demands, in order to build trust and social 
cohesion. Psychological recovery is a key part of 
community and economic recovery in a post-conflict, post-
trauma context.  The Global Academies at UoE with other 
local and global partners can contribute to thinking around 
the inter-relationship between health, mental health, 
nutrition and compassionate, sustainable communities.
• This RT meeting has resulted in the creation of a 
nascent network of expertise between academics/
researchers,24 practitioners and decision-makers in the 
UK, Syria and countries receiving academics in exile 
(primarily Turkey), which will explore further the question 
of transition and long-term contingency planning for 
food and health security in Syria. This has strengthened 
and extended partnerships such that local cultural and 
technical expertise may also be incorporated into future 
Syrian socio-economic development and reconstruction 
programmes. 
• Participants have agreed a provisional framework for 
an information ecosystem (see Figures 5a and 5b) to 
incorporate local knowledge, as well as cultural and 
technical expertise, into future Syrian socio-economic 
development and reconstruction programmes. This 
includes the development of repositories to house and 
curate a catalogue of expertise, data and ongoing research 
outputs, and funding opportunities.
• There is an important role for knowledge-broker 
organisations at the nexus of the researcher-decision-
maker-practitioner interface to identify sustainable 
communication pathways and ensure knowledge 
mobilisation across different organisational and disciplinary 
boundaries.
23 Supra note 12.
278. Discussion and Next Steps
• A provisional strategy and next steps (Box 2) for this 
network were agreed but requires further refinement:
1. Vision: A science diplomacy organisation that focuses 
on Syrian food and agriculture as an “engine for peace”.
2. Mission: To facilitate sustainable agriculture, food 
production and consumption for the long-term 
development and reconstruction of a future Syria.
3. Strategic Objectives:
• Identify future food security funding, research areas, 
education and training priorities for Syria and UK/
global partnerships.
• Develop a local, culturally appropriate and 
scientifically robust evidence-base to underpin 
decisions about food security interventions and social 
development programmes. 
• Strengthen existing research expertise of displaced 
academics in Turkey so that they might independently 
co-develop inter- and transdisciplinary research 
approaches and strategies for successful agricultural 
redevelopment in the future, which are focused on 
natural resource management and protection of 
livestock, crop and other assets. 
• There were some limitations to this RT, which demand 
attention in the future if this network is to be self-sustaining 
and effective in its efforts. These include limitations 
associated with participant diversity, time constraints 
and the particularity of contextualised data elicited from 
discursive approaches.25
Conclusion
This RT meeting enabled a process of dialogue at the 
interface of science, society and policy (Appendix 2), 
which we will seek to sustain, as it should have a positive 
impact at policy level where academic/researcher26 and 
practitioner buy-in and input are advantageous and at the 
local practitioner level where innovation and good practice 
will be encouraged. This reflexive approach is not just 
about improving anticipatory governance but also about 
emphasising the promotion of parallel partnerships between 
governance and society, in the face of uncertainty, to improve 
the future.27
25 Wodak and Meyer (2009).
26 Supra note 12.
27 Lawrie 2011; Boden et al. 2015.
28
Next Steps
1. Capitalise on existing research networks and 
resources: 
a. Comprehensive review of existing evidence bases 
(FAO, WFP etc.) and add value through empirical data 
collection, elicitation of expert opinion, data analysis etc. 
where appropriate. 
b. Gap analysis to identify knowledge and expertise gaps 
for priority areas: livestock; crop production; and natural 
resource management.
2. Build capacity through the development of portable, 
online and student-training programmes and short 
courses (delivered as MOOCs, WhatsApp etc.) that 
address skills necessary to use new technologies and 
scientific methodologies, as well as agri-business and 
finance skills:
a. Create a gateway hub to identify funding opportunities 
and partners to help access these opportunities 
successfully.
b. Develop an online repository of existing data resources, 
reports and open source literature to improve 
transparency (see for example, Zenodo: 
https://zenodo.org).
c. Develop e-learning opportunities – scalable, practical 
ways of addressing skills shortages within and outside 
the country; MOOCs co-constructed and run by local 
communities.
d. Design and implement outreach programmes, drawing 
from other case studies (Malawi, and UoE) − schools as 
a community hub.
3. Develop a programme of research (based on 
syndemics framework) to enable flexible, agile and 
timely responses to policy-relevant questions. This 
will demand a multi-disciplinary team with the relevant 
capabilities to respond to emergency, applied research 
questions and long-term curiosity-driven hypotheses.
a. Map ethics codes across different organisational 
interfaces and develop and agree on shared ethical 
guidance document.
b. Develop a communications plan for information 
ecosystem.
c. Agree shared values and ways of working (transparency, 
neutrality, independence, justice, respect, trust, 
impartiality etc.). 
4. Identify and include interested funders and other 
members for future network meetings and activities 
(see Appendix 1 for proposed additional members). 
This includes strengthening partnerships with 
health practitioners to gather data and co-construct 
evidence-based interventions to promote beneficial 
health outcomes.
5. Agree date and topics for next meeting: Seeds of 
Peace. This could be focused on a single issue or 
comprise multiple streams for discussion. Topics of 
importance identified included:
a. Climate-smart and nutrition-sensitive agriculture. 
b. Empowerment of women in agriculture (including micro-
gardens, community outreach programmes).
c. “One Health” (e.g. leishmaniasis, livestock health and 
welfare).
d. Sustainable natural-resource management: water, 
energy, food and forests.
8. Discussion and Next Steps
29
Appendix 1. Proposed additional members to join existing network of expertise
Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency  
Governmental agency https://www.jica.go.jp/english
The Japan International Cooperation Agency is a 
governmental agency that coordinates official development 
assistance for the government of Japan. Its purpose is to 
assist economic and social growth in developing countries, 
and the promotion of international cooperation.
The World Academy of 
Sciences (TWAS)











Scientific academy of UK 
and commonwealth
https://twas.org
Advancement of science in developing countries.
https://www.scpr-syria.org
Undertakes public policy-oriented research to bridge the gap 
between research and policy-making process.
http://spark-syria.eu/home
https://www.asfarifoundation.org.uk
To ensure a good education for, and encourage 
entrepreneurship among, young people from the Levant and 
the UK, to support them to work together to create positive 
change, and to strengthen civil society.
https://royalsociety.org
Dedicated to promoting excellence in science.
The SPHEIR Project
(Strategic Partnerships for 
Higher Education Innovation 
and Reform)
Partnerhip Project https://www.jica.go.jp/english
Transforming higher education with innovative partnerships 
SPHEIR (Strategic Partnerships for Higher Education 
Innovation and Reform) aims to transform higher education 
systems in focus countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East to better meet the needs of graduates and 
employers. It supports diverse, large-scale partnerships 
working across different sectors and countries to improve 
the quality, relevance, accessibility and affordability of 
higher education. It focuses on creating new and innovative 
solutions to key higher education challenges to deliver 
systemic and sustainable change at scale.
SOAS University of London https://www.soas.ac.uk
GIZ https://www.giz.de/en/aboutgiz/profile.html
A service provider in the field of international cooperation for 
sustainable development and international education work
DFID UK Government https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
department-for-international-development 
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Appendix 2. Roundtable Participants
Dr Shaher Abdullateef Hydroponics and biotechnology Cara Syria − FSL
Dr Manaf Aldakhil Agricultural engineering Aleppo University in the Liberated area
Dr Anas Alkaddour Agriculture and horticulture, potato breeding 
and biotechnology
Global Communities
Dr Ahmad Alkhalil History and Islamic civilisation Igdır University
Ms Safa Almohammad 
Alsbahi
Agricultural engineering, food science BINAA
Dr Omar Atik Plant protection Shafak
Dr Lisa Boden Veterinary public health, population 
medicine and public health law
Global Academy of Agriculture and Food 
Security, University of Edinburgh
Dr Clara Calia Clinical psychology University of Edinburgh
Ms Martina Iannizzotto Economics WFP
Dr Martin Keulertz Water-food-energy nexus AUB
Dr Tefide Kizildeniz Agricultural engineering and women’s 
studies
Gaziantep University
Mr Charles Kleinermann Political science, international relations and 
social economy
ICARDA
Dr Tom Parkinson Education and musicology University of Kent
Professor Corinne Reid Psychological therapies University of Edinburgh
Ms Kate Robertson Human rights and international programme 
management
Cara Syria Programme
Professor Geoff Simm Animal breeding Global Academy of Agriculture and Food 
Security, University of Edinburgh
Dr Mona Suilmi Social science Independent
Mr Ayham Taha Economist and political scientist Care International
Ms Ipek Velioglu Melis International relations Cara Syria
Mr Adam Yao Agriculture sciences, sustainable natural 
resources management, climate change 
and adaptation.
FAO
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